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INTRODUCTION 
Cities are the foundation of humanity’s collective social life as a gov-
erned community. In the modern world, the proportion of the global urban 
population has reached a tipping point such that, for the greater part of 
humanity, life is intimately linked to their city. Two thirds of the world’s 
people will live in cities by 2050 and a majority already live in cities to-
day.1 However, cities’ status in international law remains ambiguous. Not 
quite private entities like non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), and 
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was in CUNY’s Community & Economic Development Clinic. Mr. Bodiford has been affili-
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 1 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & 
SOC. AFFAIRS (May 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/FK4W-XHJU. 
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yet not quite states, cities occupy what could be described as an interme-
diate place of mixed quasi-sovereignty that puts them in a twilight zone 
in international law between sovereign and not sovereign.2 
Cities have been analyzed for a long time by legal scholars and his-
torians as both units of history and as entities of international law. Thu-
cydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War describes the epic battles of 
sovereign cities in ancient Greece, where cities and leagues of cities such 
as Athens and Sparta comprised a great part of international sovereigns.3 
However, since the Early Modern Era, 1500-1800 C.E., city states like 
those in Ancient Greece and in the mixed sovereignty of Medieval Europe 
have been gradually absorbed into Westphalian states and consequently 
superseded by the unified nation state with its concentration of power into 
the metropolitan center, all at the expense of the sovereignty that small 
regional powers traditionally held.4 Today, cities fall for the most part into 
a different category of sovereignty from their ancient predecessors, and 
the centralized state denies modern cities the sovereign powers of Athens 
or Sparta. However, cities still manage to maintain a distinct existence 
from national governments across the world. 
City states did not disappear with the Treaty of Westphalia.5 They 
still exist. Today, Singapore, Luxembourg, and the Vatican City are all 
 
 2 LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (6th ed. 2014) 
(discussing how non-governmental bodies can contribute to a legislative practice while not 
constituting state practice); Helmut Philipp Aust, Shining Cities on the Hill? The Global City, 
Climate Change, and International Law, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 255, 256 (2015); Janne E. Nijman, 
Renaissance of the City as Global Actor: The Role of Foreign Policy and International Law 
Practices in the Construction of Cities as Global Actors, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN 
POLICY: DRAWING AND MANAGING BOUNDARIES FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 210 (Gun-
ther Hellmann et al. eds., 2016). 
 3 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 27-28 (Richard Crawley 
trans., 2009) (ebook); see RICHARD NED LEBOW, A CULTURAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 116 (2008). 
 4 PETER WILSON, HEART OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE 171 
(2016); see Nijman, supra note 2, at 211, 214. The Westphalian state is often the name given 
to modern states that have a singular, unified claim to sovereignty sharply exclusive of any 
other overlapping claim. For Westphalian statehood as it is traditionally understood, the key 
feature of the Sovereign is this singularity: there can only be one legitimate claim to sovereign 
statehood for any particular territory. Of course, in any large or diverse country with a need 
for independent local government, authority never looks this simple, and in reality it is often 
shared as a matter of constitutional practice—take, for example, the United States’ federalist 
system. As the scope of state power has expanded to encompass more sovereign functions, 
tension between the sovereignty exercised by the city and that by the state has grown. 
 5 See generally Nijman, supra note 2, at 215-16 (discussing the shift from an interna-
tional economy controlled by sovereign territorial states to a global economy controlled by 
so-called global cities). 
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recognized by the international community as fully sovereign states.6 Yet, 
these city states are just that—cities that happen to be more or less co-
extensive with their own state. They are de facto states and are seen as 
such by the Westphalian delineation between state and non-state. In con-
trast, cities as most people understand them are very different. Almost all 
cities exist within the confines of a state’s sovereign power,7 and the role 
these cities play in international law8 is the focus of this article. 
City life as it is experienced by its citizens implies a collective social 
existence that is at once legally recognized through councils, mayors, and 
city boards, and rejected by the law as a form of real sovereignty—unlike 
that exercised by the state. Cities are sovereign, yet not quite The Sover-
eign. They are not a government unto themselves. Nonetheless, cities still 
can enjoy legal benefits of common law associated with the Sovereign, 
such as qualified immunity from certain tort claims.9 
In many ways, the state relies on the city as its foundational unit. A 
modern state without the city is unthinkable. It would be more of a tribe 
than a Westphalian state.10 Cities possess a collectivity of relationships 
between non-related people who occupy the same temporal and geo-
graphic space. Even the earliest states in Mesopotamia, Sumerian city 
states like Ur, and later Babylon at the center of the Babylonian Empire 
(circa 1900-539 B.C.E.), were based on the city whose authority spread 
outwards.11 The very language of citizenship, important to legal under-
standings of jurisdiction, alienage, constitutional rights, and state legiti-
macy, implies an etymological origin in membership of a city.12 Lan-
guage reflects this city connection: the ideals of citizenship and the 
 
 6 Vatican City, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/6X7E-THK5 (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2019); Véronique Lambert et al., Luxembourg, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://perma.cc/8A2J-XXC8 (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) (noting that Luxembourg has sover-
eignty over a limited area beyond the city); Jim Lim, Forgotten Independence: Singapore at 
53 (Or Is It 55?), INTERNAL REFERENCE (Aug. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/QK4L-9K49. 
 7 See Nijman, supra note 2, at 214 n.13. Because global cities exist within the confines 
of a state’s sovereign power, they lack city-states’ level of self-sufficiency. 
 8 See HENDRICK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS 109-11 (1994). 
Germany provides an example of city-leagues that formed for protection against feudal lords 
within the structure of the Holy Roman Empire. The city-leagues collected revenues and reg-
ulated economic activity in the midst of the development of multiple overlapping German 
authorities leading to fragmentation as the model of the sovereign state was adopted. 
 9 See Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 411 (2016); 
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (holding that qualified immunity applies to 
local police officers facing suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the officers make a 
decision that “reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances confronted.”). 
 10 See Nijman, supra note 2, at 217-18. 
 11 See ADAM WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 24-30 (1992). 
 12 See Citizen, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/BP7S-RMPG (last vis-
ited Dec. 23, 2019). 
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concepts of civil rights and of civil law all refer to the rights of the people 
in the state but derive linguistically from the word for city. Civil rights in 
English, Bürgerrecht in German, and les droits du citoyen in French all 
imply in this way a relationship to the state derived, at least conceptually, 
from the historically supported relationship that people have with the city 
as its citizens.13 
Furthermore, it would be wrong to assume that the city’s status in 
international law disappeared with the development of the nation state. 
Indeed, cities’ sovereignty should continue to be recognized given their 
emergence as global actors.14 The model of a city government—and its 
chartered reciprocal rights with the city’s inhabitants as citizens—serves 
as a forerunner of the social contract theory of reciprocal legal obligations 
which people have with the sovereign state.15 Moreover, in many places, 
the historical context of the development of the constitution is related to 
the civil rights which people enjoyed in cities16: the special rights given 
to members of the city against arbitrary power,17 and the protection from 
rural serfdom which cities extended to their citizens even in the Middle 
Ages.18 
The connections that people develop with others in and between cit-
ies also emphasize cities’ international character and therefore their im-
portance and necessity as apparent subjects of international law.19 Cities 
are often the cosmopolitan seats of international interactions and are in-
creasingly indispensable actors. Many international legal concerns—such 
as international shipping, property disputes, the effects of climate change, 
and human rights—take place in the context of international economic 
relations and social connections sited between different cities.20 Since 
Westphalia, the tendency among nation states has been to position the 
state’s institutions within a single metropole,21 creating a dominant city 
like London or Paris which in the Early Modern Era dwarfed all other 
 
 13 See WILSON, supra note 4, at 498-503; Peter Blickle, Communalism, Parliamentarism, 
Republicanism, 6 PARLIAMENTS, ESTATES & REPRESENTATION 1 (1986). 
 14 See Nijman, supra note 2, at 211; see also Barbara Oomen & Moritz Baumgärtel, Fron-
tier Cities: The Rise of Local Authorities as an Opportunity for International Human Rights 
Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 607, 609-10 (2018). 
 15 See Nijman, supra note 2, at 214-15. 
 16 WILSON, supra note 4, at 636, 660. 
 17 Id. at 636. 
 18 See id. at 504, 507; see also KARL KAUTSKY, COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE AT THE 
TIME OF THE REFORMATION 10-11 (J.L. & E.G. Mulliken trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1966) 
(1897). 
 19 See Nijman, supra note 2, at 211. 
 20 See Oomen & Baumgärtel, supra note 14, at 609-13; see also Aust, supra note 2, at 
257-58. 
 21 This is a capital city or administrative center such as Versailles. 
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cities in the state by an order of magnitude. For instance, London had 
400,000 inhabitants by 1625, twenty times more than any other English 
city.22 Nonetheless, even the most centralized traditional nation states 
have given autonomy to their cities in the form of independent mayors, 
such as in London.23 
Despite cities’ massively important role in people’s daily lives, their 
historical importance, their established relationship with sovereign rights, 
and their immediately apparent form of state power expressed through 
police, collection of local taxes, powers given to mayors, and freedom to 
provide local legal and social services, cities’ joint agreements with each 
other remain ambiguously understood in international law. Given the par-
adigm of expanded visions of sovereignty through which both the indi-
vidual and the NGO can be seen as giving expression to a type of non-
state sovereign authority, cities similarly should qualify for having limited 
quasi-sovereignty and should be seen as competent actors in international 
law.24 By considering sovereignty as more of a continuum and less of a 
binary, cities’ rights should clearly prevail over claims of unassailable 
centralized sovereignty by the state. 
This article argues that the global community should recognize the 
important role cities can play in international law as sovereign actors, es-
pecially as cities are likely to become a key unit of decision making in a 
number of important areas, such as immigration and climate change.25 
This is because many problems of international law directly implicate ar-
eas such as the environment, transportation, housing, water, and planning, 
which cities have traditionally held competence over and which address 
problems that transcend the traditional boundaries of what is considered 
a purely local, national, or international issue under the Westphalian sys-
tem.26 As the level of urbanization increases, cities’ scale and the connec-
tions of globalization further link cities’ interests to the world beyond the 
confines of their nation-states and the regions and rural hinterlands they 
find themselves in.27 Thus, cities are inevitably becoming necessary ac-
 
 22 Maurice Glasman, The City of London’s Strange History, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/YP8R-ZHN9. 
 23 See MAGNA CARTA cl. 9 (1225); Glasman, supra note 22; Development of Local Gov-
ernment, CITY OF LONDON, https://perma.cc/AER7-UNFV (last visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
 24 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 2, at 70, 92; Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sover-
eignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1999). 
 25 Aust, supra note 2, at 257-58. 
 26 Id. at 260. 
 27 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects, supra note 1. 
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tors of international law that perform indispensable functions in the inter-
national system.28 In keeping with Louis Henkin’s theory of sovereignty 
held by those traditionally considered below the sovereign state,29 cus-
tomary international law—the law of what the world does—should follow 
the developments of cities as organizations and individuals performing 
functions of sovereignty. 
Cities operate parallel to the actions of national governments in areas 
where they have competence. For example, many of the most important 
practical determinations made in international agreements regarding cli-
mate change, such as the Paris Agreement, involve questions of efficient 
energy use in power generation, transportation, land use planning, and 
other areas which fall under cities’ jurisdiction.30 In furtherance of these 
goals, the measures which the United States is obliged to fulfill under in-
ternational law to enforce the Paris Climate Agreement can be locally ac-
complished. Therefore, to achieve environmental and economic standards 
agreed upon by the international community, cities can play a crucial role 
in solving global issues at a local level.31 
Parts I and II of this article consider the history of and philosophical 
basis for mixed forms of sovereignty surviving Westphalia via customary 
international law. Part III addresses cities’ role as subjects in customary 
international law and discusses the critical questions of national govern-
ment supremacy and preemption, the role of constitutional law in the 
powers retained by cities, and the functions cities have performed thus far 
on an international scale. Part IV discusses cities’ potential to be interna-
tional actors for some of the most important questions today, including 
their role in international law for both climate and immigration. 
 
 28 Aust, supra note 2, at 256, 261; see also About C40, C40 CITIES, 
https://perma.cc/Y36P-6CP4 (last visited Dec. 23, 2019) (describing coalition of cities com-
mitted to addressing climate change through land use planning, public transportation, flood 
control, and other methods). 
 29 Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 
32-35 (1996). Customary international law is one of the primary sources of international law 
and is said to be the law of how international subjects behave. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra 
note 2, at 57, 60. City relationships in the international economy have greatly expanded, and 
cities have entered into legal relationships which evidence a greater degree of contact with 
international institutions than before. This creates an interplay between international and do-
mestic constitutional law but does not create a contradiction, as entities like the European 
Union already have such a blend. Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the Euro-
pean Union, 7 EUR. L.J. 125, 132-34 (2001). 
 30 See Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015), in U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, Addendum, An-
nex, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
 31 See ELINOR OSTROM, THE FUTURE OF THE COMMONS 70, 81-82 (2012). 
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I. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
In his Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitical Plan, Imman-
uel Kant explored, among other topics, the tendency of people to form a 
state and the problematic arrangement of state sovereignty that involves 
the subversion of imperfect humans to the will of another imperfect hu-
man.32 Kant’s theory of law embodies the idea of a law of interdependent 
states seeking the good in perpetual peace.33 Kant believed that “[t]he 
highest problem for the Human Species, to the solution of which it is ir-
resistibly urged by natural impulses, is the establishment of a universal 
Civil Society founded on the empire of political justice.”34 The potential 
for abuse of power in sovereign states where the sovereign had interests 
divergent from those of the people was obvious to Kant—and remains 
obvious today.35 
Kant believed that all things humans create are subject to the human 
condition,36 and that the vertical power structure of the all-powerful sov-
ereign ultimately exhibits the same imperfections of lawlessness and un-
controlled liberty that people exhibit.37 This suspicion of Kant’s can cer-
tainly be confirmed by the political experience of many nation-states. So, 
despite the advantages of cities and states’ sharing consistent policies and 
laws, the deficiency of subsuming a city’s power for international coop-
eration to the trust of a higher sovereign such as a state or federal govern-
ment is that the city’s particular interests continue to be difficult to resolve 
while their room for experimentation is often minimized. The best inter-
national system promotes the common good of humanity with the maxi-
mum political representation to determine the common good. Cities, like 
 
 32 See Immanuel Kant, Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitical Plan in THE 
COLLECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS DE QUINCEY 428, 434-35 (David Masson ed., 1897). 
 33 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH § 2 
(1795) (ebook), https://perma.cc/PG9J-4YUU. 
 34 Kant, supra note 32, at 433. 
 35 “But, on the other hand, in a constitution which is not republican, and under which the 
subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world to decide upon, 
because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, 
the least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, the chase, his country houses, his court func-
tions, and the like. He may, therefore, resolve on war as on a pleasure party for the most trivial 
reasons, and with perfect indifference leave the justification which decency requires to the 
diplomatic corps who are ever ready to provide it.” KANT, supra note 33, § 2. 
 36 This includes states. “To what purpose is labour bestowed upon a civil constitution 
adjusted to law for individual men, i.e. upon the creation of a Commonwealth? The same anti-
social impulse which first drove men to such a creation is again the cause that every common-
wealth, in its external relations,—i.e. as a state in reference to other states,—occupies the same 
ground of lawless and uncontrolled liberty; consequently each must anticipate from the other 
the very same evils which compelled individuals to enter the social state.” Kant, supra note 
32, at 435-36. 
 37 Id. at 436. 
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other polities, are best able to represent themselves under this logic, and 
this sentiment largely inspires the idea of federalism in the United 
States.38 
Parallel to Kant’s idealism, Hugo Grotius envisioned a system of in-
ternational law which is largely ancestral to the practice of international 
law today and which arose in the same time period as the Westphalian 
state. This system, which relies on norms, is the basis for the notion that 
the constitutions and customs which humans create should be freely fol-
lowed in all of their forms. As a founder of the tradition of natural rights 
in international law, Grotius turned to the fundamental instincts towards 
self-preservation and sociability in human nature.39 
Grotius’ conceit was generally accepted by the global community as 
the basis of international law. Indeed, Sir William Blackstone rooted the 
law of nations in natural law: “The law of nations is a system of rules, 
deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent among 
the civilized inhabitants of the world” in which “the individuals belonging 
to each [state]” were relevant in the intercourse of independent states.40 
Much of the theory that places sovereignty as a single undivided ed-
ifice is ultimately rooted in a particular time and place of the Early Mod-
ern Era, yet outside the earliest conceptions of international law. In many 
ways, this theory contrasts the concerns of many early international legal 
theorists like Grotius. For instance, Jean Bodin, French jurist and political 
philosopher of the mid to late sixteenth century, responded to the religious 
chaos in France at the time by contending that sovereignty was a singular 
Sovereign.41 Bodin is credited with introducing the concept of sover-
eignty adopted in later theory, and many of his ideas specifically opposed 
contemporary Medieval European ideas of an ultimate universal sover-
eign that lay above the state, like the Pope or the Emperor.42 However, 
this conception of sovereignty was itself ahistorical to the ways in which 
different powers actually exercised sovereignty as Bodin was writing. 
 
 38 George Clinton, Letter, Extent of Territory Under Consolidated Government Too 
Large to Preserve Liberty or Protect Property (Cato Essay No. III), NEW-YORK J. (Oct. 25, 
1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 46-47 (Bill Bailey ed., 2012) (ebook), 
https://perma.cc/N46M-HCSW. 
 39 Martti Koskenniemi, Imagining the Rule of Law: Rereading the Grotian ‘Tradition,’ 
30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 17, 34 (2019). Grotius came to a less idealistic but similar conclusion as 
Kant, that the basis of the international order should be grounded in human rights. 
 40 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66. 
 41 Edward Andrew, Jean Bodin on Sovereignty, 2 REPUBLICS LETTERS 75, 78 (2011). 
 42 Jean Bodin, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/326R-MGHQ (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2020). 
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Bodin’s theory of sovereignty is thus often interpreted more as a prescrip-
tive model for centralized states with absolute sovereigns than as a de-
scription of the “way states behave.”43 
In today’s reality, with international problems that transcend the 
scope of a single sovereign’s power and a multiplicity of international 
obligations, international norms can best be upheld by a broad range of 
different actors at different levels around the world. In the absence of John 
Austin’s supreme sovereign to enforce rules,44 all arrangements of inter-
national law require a voluntarist consensus of sovereign opinions.45 This 
favors many of the natural law conceptions of the state that were in fact 
original to international law and disfavors the supreme sovereign para-
digm that Bodin and positivist theories adopted. There is no global sov-
ereign, yet rules are accepted as part of international custom. Whether this 
happens on a smaller level with cities or exclusively with nation states, 
adherence to the law requires some form of consent on one level or an-
other by a governing body.46 Cities have been subsumed under the power 
of national laws in the name of considerations of physical location, opti-
mizing cultural influence, and military strategy.47 Given that international 
norms by definition require parties’ faith and confidence and have no ex-
ternal “policemen,” supreme “sovereign,” or even a hegemon to enforce 
the means of accountability, cities should act where the Sovereign has 
failed to enforce a monopoly on power.48 
Given history and custom, this article thus supports and furthers Hen-
kin’s analysis of sovereignty as in retreat since the beginning of interna-
tional conventions on human rights and the establishment of international 
institutions, and that local sovereignties, which may have been stripped 
away by degrees by the advance of absolutism and the European State 
system, never really went away.49 
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
The role cities play in international law has changed over time. With 
the growth of the centralized national state since the Treaty of Westphalia 
 
 43 Andrew, supra note 41. Many states have recognized varied notions of sovereignty. 
Even today, legal fictions such as “one country two systems” represent modern confusion over 
sovereignty’s strict lines. Louis Henkin posits that sovereignty has been in retreat since the 
beginning of international conventions on human rights after Nuremberg and the establish-
ment of international institutions. Henkin, supra note 29, at 31-32. 
 44 DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
 45 Id. at 59; see Koskenniemi, supra note 39. 
 46 Id.; see DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 2, at 59. 
 47 WILSON, supra note 4, at 585. 
 48 Aust, supra note 2, at 265. 
 49 Henkin, supra note 29, at 31-32. 
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1648,50 the wide autonomy of cities and other sub-national territories, 
which had existed since the Middle Age, began to be curtailed.51 Cities 
became seen as subsumed under the state. However, this was a change 
from preceding historical reality. While our modern image of the city-
state comes from Greek antiquity,52 later examples of powerful cities set 
their own policies with other cities within the framework of a larger state, 
particularly in Medieval and Early Modern Germany.53 This phenomenon 
is the subject of this section. 
A. The Holy Roman Empire 
The Middle Ages in Europe, 500-1500 C.E., featured much looser 
systems of internationally recognized sovereignty than those currently 
recognized in the modern world. The typical medieval European state 
structure featured a king or queen, a supranational church, lesser nobility 
like dukes and counts with a degree of sovereignty over their demesnes, 
and often independent cities.54 De facto control over territory often rested 
with these lesser powers who swore allegiance to a lord. Sovereignty as 
it is now understood was therefore divided: similarly to how the theory of 
property rights is interpreted even today as a bundle of rights, sovereignty 
could be seen as a public bundle of rights,55 which in the Middle Ages 
was divided between different concurrent and overlapping sovereigns that 
did not each command a monopoly on all sovereign power.56 Instead, sov-
ereignty overlapped between different authorities such as kings, popes, 
 
 50 The Treaty of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, a war that had raged in 
different phases since the Bohemian Revolt in 1618. This devastating war attracted foreign 
intervention by France and Sweden and killed up to one-third of the population of Germany. 
The treaty is considered to have granted each German principality landeshoheit, which has 
been interpreted as state sovereignty, and is seen as enshrining unified sovereignty more 
broadly. See WILSON, supra note 4, at 500. However, the treaty never ended the previous 
constitutional arrangement or the sovereignty of the Holy Roman Empire throughout Ger-
many, which remained until 1806. WILSON, supra note 4, at 171, 174, 500. 
 51 Nijman, supra note 2, at 215. 
 52 LEBOW, supra note 3, at 116. 
 53 WILSON, supra note 4, at 568-73 (discussing how the cities of the Hanseatic League in 
particular formed truly international legal agreements spanning beyond Germany). 
 54 Id. at 524-25, 528-29 (discussing how cities often exercised chartered rights). 
 55 Andrew Blom, Hugo Grotius, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://perma.cc/7TYN-AKNP (last visited Dec. 14, 2019); David A. Lake, Memorandum on 
Delegating Divisible Sovereignty 3 (Mar. 3, 2006), https://perma.cc/38DS-VHZ4 (quoting 
Hersch Lauterpacht to note that, “from the point of view of international law, sovereignty is a 
delegated bundle of rights . . . [and] therefore divisible, modifiable, and elastic”). 
 56 WILSON, supra note 4, at 172. 
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counts, dukes, cities, and even communes.57 This system created rights 
and obligations which could flow from multiple sufficient authorities.58 
For instance, a state’s control over all lands within its borders was not 
exclusive and the state’s monopoly over legitimate authority within its 
borders was not internationally recognized. This is most obvious when 
considering the enormous power and property of the medieval European 
church. The ensuing dispute over who held legitimate sovereignty con-
tributed to Bodin’s advocacy for a monopoly on sovereignty.59 
However, this particular paradigm of absolute sovereignty was not 
internationally recognized as the only source of legitimate authority. Mul-
tiple authorities could exercise different powers through chartered rights 
which had been agreed upon and which divided traditionally understood 
functions of sovereignty among them. This system persisted most 
strongly in Germany because of the constitution of the Holy Roman Em-
pire, but was also present throughout Europe, including England.60 The 
paradigm of chartered rights is implicit in one of the common law’s foun-
dational documents, the Magna Carta. For example, the Great Charter 
confirmed the rights of the City of London, which were recognized as 
ancient custom from the time of Edward the Confessor.61 
The Holy Roman Empire (800-1806 C.E.) was a peculiar continua-
tion of Charlemagne’s kingdom, claiming wide sovereignty as the highest 
sovereign recognized by the Catholic Church and also featuring wide au-
tonomy for local princes, particularly after the Golden Bull of 1356.62 In 
fifteenth-century Germany, free imperial cities (Freie Reichsstädte) de-
veloped as effectively quasi-sovereign entities in symbiosis with the sur-
rounding areas and with the Emperor.63 Their particular form of sover-
eignty coexisted with that of the Emperor, who was their only de jure 
sovereign. German free cities were granted rights and freedoms that were 
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recognized by law and custom within the community of principalities in 
the empire.64 
Unlike Italy, where some mercantile city states such as Venice func-
tioned in certain ways as miniature versions of larger, emerging central-
ized states like France or England,65 and where even many of the modern 
features of statecraft—such as permanent ambassadors—were devel-
oped,66 Germany’s model was widely understood to constitute mixed sov-
ereignty.67 Part of what distinguished the Holy Roman Empire from other 
states was that the nominal sovereign of the Emperor recognized the de 
facto autonomy of states in the Empire.68 While famously convoluted and 
byzantine in its structure and complexity, law in the Holy Roman Empire 
relied largely on established historical rights and charters granted by the 
sovereign to other localities, including cities, to exercise independent au-
thority over a particular area.69 Cities, as well as other units of the Holy 
Roman Empire, thus possessed a degree of shared sovereignty as the pre-
tense of centralized imperial authority deteriorated in the Late Middle 
Ages, never to return.70 
While prior to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the Emperor was 
properly considered the sovereign in Germany and imperial legal deci-
sions set precedent for the accepted law over much of the Empire,71 the 
Emperor did not exercise widely-accepted definitions of sovereignty, 
such as control of borders or land outside of the lands which he directly 
controlled, after 1648.72 Before and after 1648, the Emperor had largely 
indirect authority in Germany that was complemented not only by smaller 
regions’ large degree of autonomy but also by areas of at least de facto 
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regional sovereignty.73 In many instances, states in the Holy Roman Em-
pire exercised this de facto sovereignty for centuries before their status 
was formally recognized internationally. For example, the Dutch Repub-
lic and Switzerland were both recognized as sovereigns emerging out of 
the Holy Roman Empire in the Treaty of Westphalia, even though they 
exercised many of the post-Westphalian ideas of sovereignty while still 
being a part of the Holy Roman Empire.74 
Overall, cities benefited greatly from this loose constitution of the 
Holy Roman Empire. The imperial free city of Freiburg, or free town, for 
example, was created from its beginning with immunities “in a deliberate 
attempt to attract wealth and labour by offering an attractive new settle-
ment.”75 Cities were able to operate within a common imperial legal struc-
ture while also operating autonomously and making agreements with each 
other, defying the presumption that sovereignty is a binary black and 
white concept.76 
One outgrowth of the sovereign city was the league of cities. Many 
cities in the fifteenth century developed leagues with each other to pursue 
shared interests and protect their rights.77 The Décapole cities, the Saxon 
league, and the Swiss Confederacy were originally such leagues of cities, 
as were other Swiss Imperial estates.78 These city leagues formed connec-
tions with each other for reasons somewhat analogous to today’s sister 
cities arrangements. However, their connections were far more in depth 
and focused on common protection of the cities’ interests, rather than on 
one particular issue or general amity and cooperation.79 Originally, Swit-
zerland consisted of an alliance of free cities like Zürich, Bern, and Lu-
zern, which, in order to protect themselves against the claims of surround-
ing nobles and the Emperor, evolved to become a powerful group within 
the Empire.80 
Full sovereigns such as Switzerland evolved out of leagues of cities 
in the Holy Roman Empire yet continued to maintain Imperial law.81 
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When the Treaty of Westphalia established the modern principle of state 
sovereignty in international law, Switzerland gained independence 
through the plain text of the treaty and was recognized as such by the 
other great powers despite continued connection to the Holy Roman Em-
pire.82 With numerous new and tiny independent sovereigns, leagues of 
shared interests continued, primarily built off of the history and legal 
precedent of the Holy Roman Empire.83 
The Netherlands similarly emerged out of a league of shared interests 
and was not recognized as fully sovereign until after the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia, almost a century after the Union of Utrecht and hundreds of 
years after the Dutch provinces began to exercise quasi-sovereign func-
tions under the auspices of the Empire.84 The emergent Republics which 
the Dutch and Swiss founded out of the Holy Roman Empire in fact re-
tained much of the constitutional legacy of the Empire, including the pow-
ers held by estates, cities, and cantons.85 The Dutch Union of Utrecht 
maintained the diversity of customs and privileges which had evolved 
over time. The first article in the Union of Utrecht 1579 maintained that 
“provinces will form an alliance, confederation, and union among them-
selves . . . in order to remain joined together for all time in every form and 
manner, as if they constituted only one province,” and that “each province 
and the individual cities, members and inhabitants thereof shall each re-
tain undiminished its special and particular privileges, franchises, exemp-
tions” without any sense of contradiction.86 
In reality, mixed sovereignty was never abolished by Westphalia; in-
stead, it receded as the de facto arrangement of the sovereign state 
emerged.87 Indeed, when Jean-Jacques Rousseau asserted that he was a 
citizen of Geneva, this implied a relationship to a city that remains foun-
dational to our modern notions of citizenship.88 
B. Magdeburg and Lübeck Law and the Hanseatic League 
While some leagues of cities formed to protect their sovereignty, like 
Switzerland, others developed to protect their trade interests.89 The Han-
seatic League is the greatest example of this development, and a good 
 
 82 The Treaty of Westphalia § LXIII, YALE LAW SCH. AVALON PROJECT (Oct. 24, 1648), 
https://perma.cc/4W48-NBRC. 
 83 Id. at 572. 
 84 WILSON, supra note 4, at 595. 
 85 See id. at 585. 
 86 Holenstein et al., supra note 81, at 16. 
 87 See WILSON, supra note 4, at 585-89. 
 88 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY 57-58 (Maurice Cranston 
trans., Penguin Classics 1985) (1755). 
 89 WILSON, supra note 4, at 571. 
2020] CITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 
model for how city diplomacy can function in tandem with the power of 
the sovereign.90 Between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, Han-
seatic cities were both part of their respective sovereign nations and also 
part of an international league of cities with joint agreements with each 
other. The influence of the League’s leading city of Lübeck spread across 
the Baltic Sea.91 Trade spanned between far-flung Hanseatic cities, from 
a core in Northern Germany around Hamburg and Lübeck, north to Ber-
gen and Stockholm in Scandinavia, east to Danzig and Riga across the 
Baltic, and even to Novgorod in Russia.92 In some cases, Hanseatic mer-
chants set up German trading quarters within cities, such as the Kontors 
in London, Bergen, and Novgorod.93 But in many cases the cities were 
incorporated as Hanseatic merchant cities, often governed by Lübeck Law 
in circles of regional cooperation with other Hanseatic cities while simul-
taneously maintaining varying relationships with other lords or the Holy 
Roman Emperor.94 
As development spread further east in Northern Europe in the Late 
Middle Ages, these cities were able to shape the economic patterns of a 
whole region. Fueled by the influence of international cities and the com-
mon standards they adopted, the Hanseatic cities became a massive trad-
ing syndicate in which goods could be traded in accordance with the uni-
form legal standards across a whole region.95 With each city founded by 
Hanseatic merchants, Lübeck rights—which defined a city’s self-govern-
ance model—spread in different countries and harmonized the laws of the 
major trading cities.96 Merchants could travel from Lübeck to Riga to 
Stockholm and back and expect the same standards of law. Pioneered by 
cities, this international legal uniformity was an early forerunner of the 
free movement seen nowadays in the European Union.97 In many ways, 
this arrangement created a parallel form of political organization in the 
Late Middle Ages that functioned as an alternative to the sovereign 
state.98 
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Like in the Baltic region, much of the same process happened in Cen-
tral Europe as the influence of the Empire moved east and as new towns 
were founded. Many Central European towns adopted Magdeburg 
Rights—similar to Lübeck Law—as their code of laws.99 Cities in Central 
Europe became magnets for new talent and for people fleeing from the 
oppression of feudal barons in the countryside.100 Such cities pioneered 
not only population growth but also the development of uniform legal 
standards, as well as civil rights, which transcended national boundaries. 
Serfdom ended at the city gates for many.101 
The rise of cities in the Late Middle Ages, 1250-1500 C.E., therefore 
created conditions in which cities could exercise many of the functions 
that are seen today as exclusively sovereign. Cities played an economic 
role by drawing people away from the countryside and acted as a sanctu-
ary against the oppression of feudalism. Cities were crucial to the Euro-
pean economy’s shift from feudalism, as urban craftspeople and well-to-
do peasants shifted their productivity away from a feudalistic mode of 
production towards the cities, which attracted unfree peasants and created 
centers for new production and international exchange. This change even-
tually shifted market power by compelling concessions from the landed 
class.102 The cities also pioneered democratic concepts such as freedom 
and equality before the law and the right to make law through self-gov-
ernment,103 as well as helping to create the conditions for later parliamen-
tary development.104 
C. The Holy Roman Empire’s Legal System 
The Holy Roman Empire developed an extensive and sophisticated 
legal system to facilitate connections between its quasi-sovereign states 
and to settle feuds between different lords who otherwise might go to war 
with each other. The Reichskammergericht (the Supreme Court),105 the 
Hofgericht (the court presided over by the Emperor), and the Reichshofrat 
(the supreme Imperial Judicial tribunal)106 worked to enforce a system of 
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quasi-international law that covered Germany and regulated relations be-
tween the different states of the Holy Roman Empire, even after the rati-
fication of the Treaty of Westphalia.107 Like a Supreme Court or minia-
ture International Court of Justice, the Reichskammergericht in particular 
settled disputes between the many states of the Holy Roman Empire.108 
Analogous to the European Union’s institutions today, such late judicial 
institutions of the Holy Roman Empire functioned to facilitate common 
norms among the hundreds of cities and principalities of the Empire, at a 
time when authority was still exercised locally.109 This legal system facil-
itating multi-centric sovereignty persisted well into the post-1648 modern 
era of international relations. 
D. Westphalia 
The Holy Roman Empire’s model of co-sovereignty was diminished, 
though not abolished, by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, then largely 
deteriorated toward a collapse of imperial authority over the eighteenth 
century.110 The Treaty of Westphalia’s immediate effect on the Holy Ro-
man Empire was the establishment of what we would now consider to be 
a state monopoly on violence, precluding nobles and property owners 
from raising their own army.111 The dispute over who held sovereignty in 
Germany led to the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). Seen as a battle be-
tween Protestant and Catholic states, the Thirty Years War was about 
more than religion and implicated hegemony and control of European ter-
ritory, thus attracting foreign intervention by great powers such as France 
and Sweden.112 The Treaty’s signatories expressly declared that sover-
eignty rested solely with the temporal leader of the country.113 
However, the Treaty of Westphalia did not eradicate the Holy Roman 
Empire’s system of multi-centric sovereignty and constitutional govern-
ance, which continued to evolve over time.114 Despite the common per-
ception that the Holy Roman Empire’s multicentric governance was bro-
ken by the treaty, such governance continued, even as the common 
understanding of who held sovereignty in the Empire shifted towards the 
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independent states, whose localities’ position in the Empire remained le-
gally intact.115 
For instance, Switzerland had its sovereign rights explicitly con-
firmed by the Treaty of Westphalia and was regarded as a successor state 
to the Holy Roman Empire, but failed to totally break from the constitu-
tional structure of the Empire.116 The Swiss Confederation was envisioned 
as a modern constitutional state only retroactively after Westphalia, as the 
cities and rural cantons internalized the notion of the sovereign state from 
theorists like Bodin.117 When Johann Rudolf Wettstein, the mayor of the 
Swiss city of Basel, arrived in Westphalia seeking only to abolish the im-
perial appeal,118 the Emperor instead created an exemption for Switzer-
land which derived from imperial law and which the Swiss did not clearly 
distinguish from sovereignty.119 Westphalia confirmed that Switzerland 
had not paid homage to the Emperor for one hundred and fifty years and 
instead abided by its own laws, but because Switzerland failed to establish 
where sovereignty lay, the notion that both the cantons and the Confeder-
ation were free, sovereign, and independent was accepted.120 
Switzerland’s sovereignty was later reimagined with the introduction 
of the Bernese magistrate’s functions, which paralleled Bodin’s Ré-
publique.121 It was only in the practice of international law and the cus-
toms of diplomacy that Switzerland’s sovereignty was acknowledged in-
ternally in such modern terms as late as 1751 by the Swiss constitutional 
theorist Isaak Iselin.122 The only Swiss university of that time, the Uni-
versity of Basel, continued the study of imperial law until late in the sev-
enteenth century.123 The Dutch and Swiss constitutions continued to 
maintain their polycentricity of powers even after Westphalia, and Swiss 
cities abided by constitutions stemming from structures of the Empire.124 
Several Swiss cantons even continued to bear the double headed imperial 
eagle in their coat of arms in 1684, decades after Westphalia, and accord-
ing to Johann Caspar Steiner, this in no way contradicted Switzerland’s 
independence as confirmed in Westphalia.125 The inference we can draw 
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is that, based on historical reality and state practice, the hard boundary 
between “sovereign” and “not sovereign” is a modern neologism ahistor-
ical to the early era of international law immediately after Westphalia—
and that there is no contradiction between systems of mixed sovereignty 
and the sovereign state in the modern era of international law. 
Mixed sovereignty in the Holy Roman Empire persisted after 1648. 
Subsequent treaties such as the Treaty of Utrecht continued to 
acknowledge the Holy Roman Empire as a sovereign state and recognize 
its unique constitutional arrangement despite the fact that it differed 
sharply from the centralized state systems of France and Britain.126 Impe-
rial states were considered both sovereign actors and party to the Holy 
Roman Empire’s constitutional system, and practically speaking, sover-
eignty was always more fluid than states acknowledged.127 
Sovereignty would remain ambiguous in the Holy Roman Empire 
while the Empire kept different negotiated rights of various principalities 
under a unifying ideological, political, and legal framework.128 These 
practical arrangements of ambiguous sovereignty continued well after the 
Treaty of Westphalia, and there were so many different forms of sover-
eignty in the Empire that did not seem contradictory to most people at the 
time.129 
Successor states also adopted this model from the Holy Roman Em-
pire. For instance, the Netherlands emerged as fully sovereign out of the 
Treaty of Westphalia and retained large amounts of autonomy for both its 
provinces and cities, which conducted international trade across the 
world.130 The city of Amsterdam extensively influenced terms of trade 
through its stake in the Dutch East India Company,131 and representatives 
of Dutch cities banded together to promote their common trade interests, 
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which even extended to affirming treaties.132 The Netherlands maintained 
a system of estates in which cities remained immensely powerful and 
were considered sovereign by international observers.133 
By granting de jure independence to the states that had already exer-
cised de facto independence, the Treaty of Westphalia also transformed 
many free imperial cities into more fully sovereign city-states, a status 
that the most powerful of them kept until the reunification of Germany 
under Bismarck in the nineteenth century.134 Some powerful cities like 
Hamburg became recognized under this system, which is still reflected in 
the political geography of modern Germany. Hamburg emerged as a pow-
erful city-state after the Westphalian system with a great tradition of in-
ternational trade deriving from the era of the Hanseatic League.135 Today, 
Hamburg maintains its own Bundesland (a subnational state) with its his-
torical title as the Freie und Hanseatische Stadt Hamburg (Free and Han-
seatic City of Hamburg).136 
Examples like the Free City of Danzig, a formerly Hanseatic City 
established after World War I,137 and the Free City of Trieste, both port 
cities formerly part of the Holy Roman Empire, coincidentally or not, re-
flect a view of cities that closely resembles the historical precedent of free 
imperial cities, even as they were considered to have characteristics of the 
sovereign state. This is not merely a historical curiosity: city states with 
mixed sovereignty continue to persist even today, as in the case of Hong 
Kong.138 Protests in Hong Kong that have erupted in 2019 show a dispute 
over the real nature of self-rule over the city, which formally passed from 
British to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 but which also formally remained 
a separate territory—one which maintains its own flag, border controls 
with mainland China, and a separate constitution which protestors are de-
fending under the banner of universal suffrage. This is the essence of what 
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China has called “one country two systems,” the contours of which are in 
dispute.139 Other examples come from the Commonwealth of Nations, 
where sovereign countries such as Canada and New Zealand share the 
British monarch as the head of state. Commonwealth countries’ diplo-
matic offices are called “high commissions” and some still share aspects 
of a judicial system with Britain.140 Until 2004, New Zealand’s final court 
of appeal was the Privy Council, the formal body of advisors to the sov-
ereign of the United Kingdom,141 and Jamaica continues to appeal to this 
body even today.142 Brunei, although not a Commonwealth member, does 
so in some limited civil cases.143 Nevertheless, all of these countries are 
considered full sovereigns by the international community. 
The post-World War II era of international law added individual 
rights to the international legal framework. The Grotian tradition in inter-
national law thus continued after the two World Wars, reappearing as 
norms in modern international law. Another product of the history of Ger-
many, the Nuremberg trials for Nazi war crimes established the principle 
of international human rights, the obligation on the individual, and key 
limits on the state’s authority, all while international institutions and mul-
tinational governance structures formed.144 This principle became central 
to the system of international law after the conclusion of World War II.145 
Customary international law is generally said to be the law of how nations 
behave.146 The international role of cities has become increasingly prom-
inent as the world has become more interconnected since the nineteenth 
century, which is often considered the apex of the absolute sovereign of 
the territorial nation state.147 Cities have been acting as global players in 
the international arena since the conclusion of the Second World War.148 
The Holy Roman Empire’s sovereign development post-Westphalia 
is a useful paradigm to consider and analyze in light of the modern 
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world’s predominant rigid airtight conceptions of sovereignty. The sig-
nificance was clear post-World War II, as states once again accepted some 
limits on their capacity for violence and shared governance in the form of 
the United Nations, multi-lateral institutions, and the transnational Euro-
pean Union.149 What we can draw from the Holy Roman Empire’s con-
stitution both before and after Westphalia is that sovereignty can be fluid 
and shared with cities without negating the modern state system—and in 
fact, this was a reality well into the modern era of international law and 
has been accepted as such. A strong national state is not the only form of 
sovereignty available to the modern global community: modern cities can 
tackle joint problems and harmonize their municipal laws to reflect inter-
national standards across borders for the greater good of their citizens. 
They have done it before. 
III. CITIES AS SUBJECTS IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Cities should be considered entities that are becoming emergent in-
ternational actors and subjects of international law. The United Nations’ 
adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, which followed the Mil-
lennium Development Goals, emphasizes this fact. Specifically, Sustain-
able Development Goal 11 reflects cities’ emerging role in international 
relations, as do Goals 16 and 17.150 In particular, Goal 11 sets an interna-
tional policy for good urban governance.151 Increasingly, cities are “re-
quired to take international normative expectations into account when 
they plan and make decisions.”152 Cities ought to be considered interna-
tional subjects in Sustainable Development Goal 11, which was generally 
accepted by the member states that were present, even as heated debates 
surrounded the broader adoption of the other Goals.153 
In international practice, relations between cities and international 
institutions have progressed especially far. For instance, in 2010, the City 
of Rio de Janeiro received a loan directly from the World Bank.154 In-
creasingly, the reality of the world challenges the traditional dualism of 
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state and non-state, and the law of custom reflects this pattern.155 The uni-
versality of human rights law already binds cities with their residents in 
international law,156 and, over time, secondary law developed by the 
United Nations and the World Bank has become “a voluminous body of 
general rules applicable to cooperation with cities,”157 which includes 
quasi-judicial functions.158 In international custom, cities are returning to 
a place they have previously held. 
Arguably, agreements between international organizations and cities 
have already taken on some characteristics of treaties, functioning as cus-
tom outside the Vienna Convention.159 This international custom is “com-
mon practice” in Brazil, where cities’ para-diplomatic activities have been 
supported by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry.160 Similarly, international 
norms of local law have been recognized constitutionally in South Af-
rica.161 
Individuals and organizations at the very least hold quasi-sovereign 
characteristics under the increasingly accepted and expanded purview of 
what it means to be an international actor.162 Cities should be seen as 
quasi-sovereign as well. As described above, cities’ international role jus-
tifies the view that “a rich history of foreign relations between urban po-
litical communities” has always existed, continues to exist, and thus 
should be recognized as such in customary international law.163 
As cities grapple with international issues that cross borders and af-
fect all humanity, such as climate change and immigration, joint city 
agreements should also be recognized as sources of customary interna-
tional law. It is in the interest of achieving a minimal world order that as 
many participants as possible are included in the world’s international 
system. Having multiple layers of acceptance of international norms also 
only serves to strengthen states’ adherence to these norms. The increased 
weight and influence of cities in areas central to international law suggests 
that they are a critical piece of the puzzle in solving global issues. The top 
twenty-five metropolitan areas combined constitute over half of the 
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United States’ gross domestic product (GDP)164 and the C40, a network 
of the world’s megacities committed to address climate change, purports 
to represent twenty-five percent of global GDP, which is on par with the 
United States, the European Union, and China.165 This shows that, with 
the extensive powers held by local governments, cities’ action is becom-
ing essential in addressing global issues, particularly in combating climate 
change in the face of nations’ intransigence and gridlock. 
In practice, international agreements are intrinsically multicentric. 
They are de facto anarchic: there is no international so-called super sov-
ereign enforcing the norms of international law, and joint international 
agreements require only the signatories’ voluntary compliance.166 Cities’ 
role in this system can be symbiotic with the already voluntary nature of 
international law. If one nation places a particular reservation on an inter-
national treaty, why not recognize cities’ ability to fully commit to up-
holding international law to the extent of their competent powers? This 
would create multiple avenues for adherence to international norms other 
than just the tollbooth of the centralized state.167 While not covered as 
sovereigns in the Vienna Convention on treaties, “other subjects of inter-
national law” are explicitly recognized as having legal treaty capacity un-
der some other source, such as customary international law.168 Thus, cities 
should receive the support of customary international law as competent 
subjects and their capacity to create agreements should be recognized by 
the international community. 
The inclusion of cities into the international arena follows the prece-
dents which have been set in the historic development of sovereignty and 
which have continued with the transformation of other non-state actors, 
such as international organizations and NGOs, into international legal 
subjects.169 Indeed, international organizations have exercised interna-
tional legal capacity in a variety of ways which have traditionally been 
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considered reserved for sovereigns, including concluding treaties, send-
ing and receiving ambassadors, and even occupying territory.170 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council Article 71 pro-
vides that it may “make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its 
competence.”171 NGOs have participated in that framework, seeking to 
set standards on the use of landmines through an inter-state treaty re-
gime.172 This shows that non-state sovereigns can be recognized by the 
global community as sovereign or quasi-sovereign subjects of interna-
tional law. The framework for cities in international law should follow 
this precedent. Para-diplomatic activities should be recognized as an in-
ternational custom, and cities recognized as subjects of international 
law—and as limited sovereigns—subject to limitations placed on this role 
by relevant constitutional law. Opening up the arena of international law 
to cities would contribute to the philosophical goal of attaining a minimal 
world order for international cooperation and the global good. 
A. Preemption and National Government Supremacy 
The most obvious problem with cities forming international agree-
ments with other foreign cities is the exclusivity which sovereign states 
claim for foreign policy. As this article contends, this is largely an avoid-
able problem because the agreements which cities make with each other 
fall outside of the scope of sovereign foreign policy, and cities thus have 
freedom to adhere to both international norms and sovereign policies.173 
The existence of different layers of governance is intrinsic to many 
federal systems. In United States jurisprudence, for example, there are 
different levels of competence which the federal, state, and local govern-
ments claim for themselves. This could serve as a model for how cities 
could interact with different sources of law. Notably, there is an important 
distinction between domestic constitutional law and international law. 
Agreements made between cities may have an international character, as 
long as they are not barred by domestic constitutional law—although the 
precise boundaries between domestic constitutional law and international 
law may at times be blurred in mixed sovereignty systems like the Euro-
pean Union. There are various areas of policy with varying levels of con-
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flict that naturally dictate how most sovereign states will react to autono-
mous agreements made by cities.174 Sophisticated mixed sovereignty sys-
tems, such as the European Union, analogously may limit a sovereign 
state’s power in certain areas like trade while simultaneously not abrogat-
ing the state’s sovereignty. For example, following the Van Gend en Loos 
decision, the European legal concept of “direct effect” did not implicate 
any abrogation of the Netherlands’ status as a sovereign state.175 Mixed 
sovereignty implies no internal contradiction here.176 
National governments reserve some traditional areas of competence 
to themselves. Preemption in the United States is one example of this. The 
United States’ preemption doctrine has mostly dealt with states’ actions 
but is applicable to cities as well, since they are considered incorporated 
under state law. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
states that the Constitution is the “supreme law of the land,” and that fed-
eral laws have precedence.177 This is the basis of the preemption doctrine, 
which has been extensively litigated by American courts. However, fed-
eral preemption intends to only preempt state and local laws which intrude 
on powers reserved solely for the federal government, or where there is a 
direct conflict with federal law. The preemption doctrine does not apply 
to instances where local regulation derives power from a source not barred 
by the U.S. Constitution or the federal government.178 Outside of an con-
flict between federal and state laws in an area in which the federal gov-
ernment has authority to legislate, the text  of the Supremacy Clause does 
not explicitly prevent local authorities from being in charge of decision-
making. If anything, it recognizes the multiplicity of laws which exist in 
a federal system and encourages adherence to federal, state, and local 
laws.179 
There is the least potential for conflict in a city-made agreement that 
reflects state-endorsed policies and which relates to issues that the sover-
eign does not traditionally claim monopoly over.180 In contrast, an agree-
ment that conflicts with the sovereign state’s national policies and deals 
 
 174 See id. at 141. 
 175 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 
E.C.R. 1; see The Direct Effect of European Law, EUR-LEX, https://perma.cc/H53E-AWND 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2020). 
 176 This has been expressed in the literature of the European Union as multi-level govern-
ance. IAN BACHE ET AL., POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 33 (3d ed. 2011). 
 177 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.”). 
 178 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 
190, 213 (1983); id. at 225 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 179 See generally Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
 180 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 213, 225. 
2020] CITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 
with a category of decision-making over which the national government 
traditionally claims a monopoly, such as immigration law, may result in 
opposition.181 Many of the issues most likely to result in city agreements 
across international borders concern economic and environmental protec-
tions, which the U.S. national government may have been silent on.182 
Today, cities and regional governments have taken action on these issues 
on an international level. For example, in light of President Trump’s de-
cision to pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement, California has 
recently signed a deal with China to cooperate on climate change.183 
Germany, Canada, the United States, and India constitute prime ex-
amples of states whose national and local powers are constitutionally sep-
arated. While the United States often claims hard sovereignist positions 
in international law, it is probably the best example of a country whose 
national constitution can facilitate extensive international city agree-
ments. Implicit in the United States Constitution is the continuation of 
limited state sovereignty deriving from the British colonial period.184 The 
branches of the U.S. federal government operate from a set of enumerated 
powers delegated to them by the Constitution, and various forms of sov-
ereignty have always remained with state and local governments.185 U.S. 
cities have long exercised sovereign powers—even during the British co-
lonial period. For example, Massachusetts preserved New England town-
ships’ powers.186 Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment specifically re-
serves powers not enumerated in the Constitution as delegated to the 
federal government for the states and the people, and the Ninth Amend-
ment explicitly states that the enumeration of certain rights in the Consti-
tution should not be construed to exclude other rights not mentioned.187 
As a result, since the inception of the Constitution in 1789, cities have not 
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been impeded from acting in areas where they have always had sovereign 
power in the U.S. constitutional system.188 
While the end of the American Civil War conclusively established 
the unity of the United States and the primacy of the federal govern-
ment,189 powerful state governments have remained part of the American 
constitutional framework.190 “It is incontestible that the Constitution es-
tablished a system of ‘dual sovereignty,’”191 and states in this system re-
tained a “residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”192 The Framers estab-
lished a constitutional authority in which multiple sovereigns would 
therefore “exercise concurrent authority over the people.”193 While the 
Constitution’s idea of mixed sovereignty always conceived of state gov-
ernments as the primary sub-national unit endowed with sovereign rights 
before the Constitution’s adoption,194 the United States’ constitutional 
structure is just as amenable to reflect cities’ independence as limited sov-
ereigns. Cities’ rights were not abrogated by the Constitution. They con-
tinue to exist, and they continue to be widely exercised. 
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence has conclusively held that the fed-
eral government cannot commandeer state legislatures or state adminis-
trative resources.195 The place of cities within this framework is unclear; 
however, they ought to receive the same protection that municipal corpo-
rations do under state law. The Founders clearly envisioned that mixed 
sovereignty extended to city governments. As stated by James Madison: 
Among communities united for particular purposes, [supremacy] 
is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legisla-
tures . . . . [and] the local or municipal authorities form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, 
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within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the 
general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.196 
To reiterate, there is a distinction between constitutional and interna-
tional law, both of which cities are subject to, and while it is necessary in 
practice for cities to have a constitutional right to form international 
agreements, they often do constitutionally form these agreements, which 
should be considered subject to international law. 
While the U.S. Constitution prohibits sub-national governments 
from creating treaties with other countries,197 nothing prevents them from 
making agreements with other non-sovereigns or agreements without the 
characteristics of treaties. For example, agreements between cities may 
avoid the exclusivity of the national state’s international diplomacy with 
foreign sovereigns, since cities do not legally have the status of full sov-
ereign states under international law. But if city agreements do not con-
travene another law, they can receive international and local recognition 
as part of customary international law and can even form regional norms 
and customs. The inference that can thus be drawn from the American 
federalist structure is that the relationship between sub-national and fed-
eral law is coextensive and adherence to both systems of law is welcomed. 
Only the federal government’s interdict through constitutionally enumer-
ated powers can limit the competence of other governments, which are 
otherwise free and sovereign. 
Historical precedent for such city agreements also shows the bound-
aries of what cities can do without being preempted by national law. For 
example, the 1980s era campaigns calling for divestment from South Af-
rica in protest of the country’s apartheid system were an international 
movement that was often implemented by cities and, in some instances, 
even by levels of governance like universities and agencies.198 This all 
happened in spite of the fact that divestment touched on sensitive areas of 
diplomatic relations with a foreign sovereign, a field traditionally claimed 
by the sovereign state. The divestment campaign had the potential to em-
barrass sovereign states, thwart official diplomatic relations, and contra-
vene the stance taken by a foreign ministry, and though all these consid-
erations weighed against cities’ authority to conduct policy, the apartheid 
 
 196 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
 197 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 198 Brentin Mock, When Cities Fought the Feds over Apartheid, CITYLAB (May 24, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/VDK8-MNAV; see, e.g., Richard Knight, Sanctions, Disinvestment, and U.S. 
Corporations in South Africa, in SANCTIONING APARTHEID 67-90 (Robert E. Edgar ed., 1990); 
David Rosenberg, Trustees Vote for Divestiture from Backers of S. African Government, 
COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR (June 8, 1978), https://perma.cc/9SB4-ZMPT. 
30 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:1 
divestment campaign was widely successful.199 This suggests an emer-
gent principle of customary international law: cities’ ability to enforce 
norms vis-à-vis the state.200 
A set of general principles of international law can be derived from 
these patterns of local government behavior. The most important principle 
that we can derive is that independent action by city governments should 
be recognized as legitimate as under customary international law to the 
extent that city governments act within their constitutional power and 
their actions are not preempted by legislation of the state. 
B. Cities’ Unique Abilities 
More than a region, a state, or any other subnational unit, cities are 
able to achieve the supposed goals of local political control: decisions that 
are closer to the ground and sensitive to local conditions. Cities represent 
a true community of interests in which people can come together and ex-
ercise civic virtue to further important community interests; they are de-
fined by their communitarian interests, like economy and housing, as op-
posed to a nation state’s commonality of religion or ethnicity. Regions, on 
the other hand, often function as miniature versions of national states.201 
European regions like Scotland, Catalonia, and Flanders are defined 
more by separate nationality than any collective interest in local govern-
ment. Cities, on the other hand, are uniquely able to piece together local 
political interests, while their cosmopolitan character separates them from 
the parochialism of regions.202 Regions also often feature stark differ-
ences between industrialized areas and their rural hinterlands, which cities 
do not face. This makes cities the most efficient mechanisms for directing 
specific improvements critical to the betterment of human civilization, 
and is also largely the reason why functions like education, land use plan-
ning, transportation, energy, and waste management are managed mostly 
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by cities.203 These functions make cities particularly effective at manag-
ing the effects of a global tragedy of the commons, such as climate 
change, adaptation for which often requires extensive experimentation.204 
In fighting climate change, cities will be critical to devising and imple-
menting rational policies against polluters.205 At the same time, concerted 
activity by cities on the international level promises to deliver the sort of 
economy of scale capable of putting pressure on major industries, if the 
combined GDP of the world’s cities is brought to bear.206 
Most importantly, cities working in cooperation with each other can, 
more than any other unit of government, unite to deal with common global 
problems that challenge the parochial interests of a nation or a region, and 
which require people to act together around the world.207 As cities’ inter-
ests gradually converge and the problem of climate change is universally 
recognized by science and the international community, the threat to cities 
like New York, Amsterdam, Jakarta, Miami, Kolkata, Venice, Alexan-
dria, and Mombasa is universal, and action by these cities becomes nec-
essary to prevent harms affecting them all. 
While national interests in a particular industry might preclude all 
nations from acting together,208 by relying on a diversity of different lev-
els of sovereignty, an agreement which encompasses a patchwork of the 
world’s cities with the world’s highest GDP may be able to drag even the 
greatest geo-political troglodytes kicking and screaming into the twenty-
first century. Of course, cities are also often bastions of wealth and privi-
lege, particularly in the current economy where powerful global cities are 
magnets for finance and technology.209 In fact, cities exemplify much of 
the modern problems of economic and social inequality.210 However, 
through the use of public spaces and communal living, cities are also some 
of the greatest incubators for solutions to inequality.211 
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IV. CITY RIGHTS TODAY 
Federal constitutions like that of the United States prevent cities from 
forming truly independent foreign policies with other countries. Never-
theless, cities retain wide constitutional latitude to act and municipal in-
dependence remains. Cities have continued to form treaties of friendship 
across the world and have also shown a unique ability to learn from each 
other.212 Mayors frequently visit other countries’ major cities to glean in-
sight into similar problems facing their own cities.213 In a global world, 
cities often have more in common with other cities in faraway countries 
in terms of culture, politics, and economy than they do with their own 
hinterlands.214 Still, these kinds of agreements have increasingly blurred 
the distinction between city and state policy. In one poignant recent ex-
ample, the City of Prague and the City of Beijing’s sister city agreement 
failed after the newly elected mayor of Prague objected to the agreement’s 
mention of the One China policy, to which China responded strongly.215 
The President of the Czech Republic responded by noting that Prague’s 
policies are not the same as those of the Czech Republic, and the Czech 
Foreign Ministry, which recognizes the One China policy, simply de-
clined to get involved.216 
To formulate a truly independent policy of cities that can maximize 
cities’ ability to effect change through the use of constitutional powers is 
the challenge cities have to navigate. In the United States, federalism 
gives states the ability to craft their own policies in many different ar-
eas.217 For instance, states and cities have very different policies concern-
ing the legalization of marijuana,218 and there has been discussion among 
legislators about creating interstate compacts on climate change and even 
election reform.219 However, unlike states, which often function as 
smaller versions of the federal government, cities often maintain an inter-
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national character: they have their own residents, regardless of those res-
idents’ place of origin, and provide a means of furthering their residents’ 
common goals independently of the national government. The growth of 
sanctuary cities in the United States is a good example of this phenome-
non.220 Other similar arrangements exist around the world.221 
However, the true test of a city’s ability to develop its own policy is 
the area of climate change. The vast majority of the world’s GDP, which 
fuels consumption and therefore affects climate change, takes place in 
cities and metropolitan areas.222 Cities can work together to develop better 
climate tactics than those introduced by their national governments, and 
they can do it with their own local knowledge. Furthermore, the problem 
of climate change presents a true global moral challenge the likes of 
which has not yet been seen. The value of the international legal and eth-
ical framework, which has been widely accepted to protect the climate, is 
itself an imperative for the future of humanity.223 To this, all levels of 
government should answer the call to change the world for the future of 
our planet. 
A. Cities as Agents Against Climate Change 
Cities have zoning and land use management capabilities that allow 
them to deal with the problems of climate change on a local level where 
national governments have failed to deal with this issue themselves.224 
Cities can do so in two ways. First, cities can make agreements with each 
other across international borders that should be considered quasi-sover-
eign acts and accepted and enforced as part of customary international 
law.225 Second, cities can act to enforce agreements to comply with inter-
national norms that their national governments have not been willing to 
enforce or fully comply with.226 
Mechanisms for intercity cooperation exist. Stemming from the orig-
inal twinning arrangements borne out of World War II,227 cities continue 
to cooperate within cultural, economic, and environmental realms to har-
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monize their policies, generate new ideas, and promote cultural aware-
ness.228 The cities of Dresden and Coventry, for example, have a shared 
heritage of destruction during World War II and have cooperated as twin 
cities: the bombed Cathedral in Dresden was partially rebuilt with British 
aid.229 New York has adopted London’s solution to traffic congestion by 
legislating and enforcing congestion restrictions and developing bike in-
frastructure programs.230 
Likewise, cities across the world can agree on and commit to inter-
national climate targets, such as those agreed to in the Paris Accords, in 
order to tackle emissions in the most densely populated cities, cities like 
Mumbai, New York, Mexico City, and Manila which face similar chal-
lenges. Similarly, California’s former governor Jerry Brown committed 
to uphold the Paris Agreement—despite the Trump Administration’s 
abandonment of the global compact—by working both with China’s na-
tional government and with the regional government of the Province of 
Jiangsu.231 Finally, the Global Parliament of Mayors creates a structure 
of international governance which mayors can use to achieve common 
goals. Leagues, not unlike the historical Hanseatic League, could conceiv-
ably develop to promote the economic, ecological, and social interests of 
cities and their citizens around the world as an evolution of this move-
ment. 
B. Sanctuary Cities 
Cities have a critical role to play in the realm of immigrants’ rights 
as well. Specifically, in the United States, but also in other countries such 
as the Netherlands, the sanctuary movement plays an increasingly im-
portant role.232 Sanctuary cities in the United States are cities which have 
refused to allow city resources to be used for the purposes of federal im-
migration enforcement. This trend is not limited to the United States; in 
Europe, local authorities have refused to allow their resources to be used 
for nationally-directed immigration enforcement that seeks to deprive im-
migrants of their residence in countries where they have often lived their 
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entire lives.233 In congruence with international legal norms,234 many cit-
ies give protection to refugees and asylum seekers.235 This is a particularly 
relevant issue in Europe given the aftermath of the refugee crisis, which 
has left many asylum seekers in legal limbo,236 and European cities have 
acted to protect refugees’ rights contrary to the objectives of their respec-
tive national governments.237 
Sanctuary cities in the United States largely take advantage of the 
country’s federalist framework. It is well-understood legal precedent that 
the federal government cannot commandeer state and local legislatures.238 
While national immigration law is considered a matter for federal legis-
lation,239 the national government’s relationship with the local enforce-
ment of these federal laws remains in question, and sanctuary cities often 
refuse to use local law enforcement or city agencies to track and report 
people with outstanding deportation or removal orders to federal agencies 
that can execute those orders. The conflict between such local practices 
and federal immigration policy has led to the development—and litigation 
over—federal policies that seek to coerce sanctuary cities to comply with 
federal standards by withholding federal funding.240 
In recent years, constitutional analysis in the United States has 
clearly trended toward affirming the doctrine barring federal comman-
deering. In Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Su-
preme Court struck down the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act on anti-commandeering grounds.241 Notably, in City of Los Angeles 
v. Barr, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Community Oriented Policing 
Services grant, which Los Angeles did not score highly enough to receive, 
did not constitute a violation of the Tenth Amendment.242 In this case, a 
federal grant system allotted additional points to city applicants which 
showed that they were furthering federal immigration goals.243 However, 
the case involved a federal grant where immigration enforcement was 
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merely a factor in deciding which cities received the grant and how exec-
utive agencies allocated their own funds.244 This is a far cry from the fed-
eral government enjoining a city from independent action. 
Another issue which has arisen is whether cities’ reliance on federal 
law can shield them from a Fourth Amendment constitutional violation, 
specifically where a local government wishes to detain a criminal defend-
ant pursuant to a federal immigration order. The Second Circuit recently 
ruled that, where the city detained a defendant for four days relying on a 
federal immigration order, “the City could not blindly rely on the federal 
detainer in the circumstances.”245 Similarly, the Third Circuit has ruled 
that a city’s suspicion that a criminal defendant has violated an immigra-
tion law is not enough to create probable cause to detain that defendant 
where probable cause is otherwise lacking.246 These rulings suggest that, 
in the federalist framework of the United States, cities have an independ-
ent responsibility to uphold the Constitution, and that constitutional tort 
liability cannot be avoided because of a federal immigration order. 
Overall, recent case law suggests that there is extensive room consti-
tutionally that may allow U.S. cities to maneuver to defend immigrants’ 
rights. In addition, cities could also be liable for violations of international 
human rights law, and cities should expand this federalist argument to 
assert their right to act in accordance with customary international law, 
particularly with regards to international standards on asylum. Through 
the use of local powers, cities can protect immigrants and adhere to a dif-
ferent framework than that demanded by national law. 
CONCLUSION 
Cities have acted as international subjects throughout history. The 
historical record is clear that cities have existed as sovereigns in a system 
of multi-centric sovereignty, particularly in Early Modern Germany and 
the Holy Roman Empire, up to and even after the Treaty of Westphalia. 
Far from abolishing mixed sovereignty, Westphalia kept it in place, and 
cities have not only experienced a renaissance in political power since 
World War II but have continued to perform functions of international 
subjects to the present day. Nowadays, cities are more important than ever 
before. Cities are able to tackle the most urgent problems humanity is 
facing today, such as climate change and migration. Cities’ unique prox-
imity to their citizens and communities allows cities to create better solu-
tions that can serve an entire community, not the lucky few—and to op-
erate at a level of governance that can uphold international norms. Thus, 
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cities’ role as sovereign players in the international arena is crucial for 
confronting the interconnected global crises humanity faces today, rang-
ing from natural disasters to famine, migration, and climate change. Sov-
ereign in history and in customary law, cities should be recognized as such 
by the global community and be finally welcomed to the arena of the in-
ternational law. 
